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Comments

I

Crossing Textualist Paths: An Analysis of
the Proper Textualist Interpretation of "Use"
Under Section 3B 1.4 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines for "Using" a Minor
To Commit a Crime
John J. DiChello, Jr.*
I.

Introduction

Children represent the promise of tomorrow and are our most
valuable human resource. 1 Unfortunately, children are also our "most
vulnerable resource. ' ,2 America has witnessed a rising wave of crimes
involving minors.3 Rather than being recruited for athletics or the debate
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2003. The author would like to thank Professor Francis J. Mootz, former
Dickinson Law Review Comments Editor Gregory G. Jackson, and Dickinson Law
Review Editor-in-Chief Quin M. Sorenson for their input and constructive critiques of
earlier drafts of this comment.
1. See 137 CONG. REc. 8884 (1991).
2. Id. Too many children are forced by adults to commit crimes, and adult
criminals view youth as "a promise of future crimes committed." Id. Once children are
turned down the path of crime, it becomes difficult to turn them away. See id.
3. For instance, twenty-five percent of all persons arrested for robbery in 1999 were
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team, children are being encouraged to join other teams, such as gangs. 4
In addition, "these young kids are already being recruited as foot soldiers
by adults with more expansive organized crime activities, such as
gambling, money laundering, and extortion." 5 In 1999, law enforcement
agencies made an estimated 2.5 million arrests of persons under the age
of eighteen.6 Congress recognized this problem and vowed to hold
accountable those who "recruit," "induce," or "coerce" minors to commit
crimes.7
In order to deter adult criminals from committing crimes with the
assistance of minors, the United States Sentencing Commission 8 adopted
section 3B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter
"Guidelines"). Section 3B1.4 is a sentencing enhancement penalty for
adults who use minors to commit a crime. 9 This provision states:
If the defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen

years of age to commit the offense or assist in avoiding detection of,
or apprehension for, the offense, increase [the sentence] by two

under the age of eighteen. See OFFICE OF

JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILE PROPORTION OF ARRESTS BY
OFFENSE, 1999 (2000). It is a "heinous circumstance" when an adult criminal uses a

child to commit a crime. 139 CONG. REC. 15638 (1993).
4. See 137 CONG. REC. 8884 (1991). These other "teams" believe that "the best
offense is a good terrorist who can beat the competition with the plunge of a knife or the
squeeze of a trigger." Id.; see also Robert Reinhold, Modern-Day "Fagins" Admit to
Series of Bank Robberies, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1993, at B10 (discussing the convictions
of two adults for "training boys not to pick pockets as in Dickens's, Oliver Twist, but to
invade banks with automatic weapons").
5. 137 CONG. REC. 8884 (1991).

6.

See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note

3.

7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (1994). Congress found that
adults induce too many children into performing criminal acts and that the greatest effort
must be taken to eliminate crime among children. See Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2002).
8. In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission, charging it
with establishing sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system.
See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1985). The Sentencing Commission is an agency in the judicial
branch and consists of seven voting members, three of whom are required to be federal
judges, and one non-voting member. See id. Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the
Commission bind the federal courts. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
The Commission periodically reviews the Guidelines and revises them. See 28 U.S.C. §
994 (2002). Congress delegated authority to the Sentencing Commission to enhance
sentences for adults who use minors to commit a crime in the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2002).
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (2000). Section 3B1.4 may
have resulted in part because the juvenile justice system treats minors leniently, allowing
them to escape punishment for committing crimes. This provision compensates for this
leniency by attaching a higher penalty to the adult who facilitates the juvenile's actions.
Therefore, if an adult "uses" a minor to commit a crime, he or she receives a higher
penalty. Id. § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1.
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levels. 1

"Used or attempted to use" includes "directing, commanding,
encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or
soliciting."' 1
The circumstances under which a court can enhance a sentence
under section 3B1.4 seem clear. Recently, however, this provision has2
been the subject of considerable disagreement among federal courts.1
The focus of this disagreement is the meaning of the term "use" in
14
section 3B 143 The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Butler,
interpreted "use" to require "affirmative steps" on the part of an adult to
involve a minor in a crime. 15 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v. McClain,'6 construed the term "use" to mean that an adult could
that the actions would lead to the involvement
have reasonably foreseen
17
of a minor in a crime.
Because a sentencing enhancement results in longer prison
sentences for defendants,' 8 the establishment of a definitive construction
of "use" is imperative. It seems unfair that an adult in the Eleventh
Circuit who "used" a minor to commit a crime will be subject to a
sentence quite different than that of an adult in the Sixth Circuit who
"used" a minor in the same manner. Until the meaning of "use" is

10. Id. § 3B1.4 (emphasis added). Some scholars argue that the Guidelines are
dysfunctional because they create adverse effects such as overcrowded prisons. See Marc
L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart (land): The Long Search for
Administrative Sentencing, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 723, 726 (1999) [hereinafter Miller];
see also United States v. Mackins, 218 F.3d 263, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (Bright, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Guidelines for not achieving "honest, wise, or equal
sentencing").
11. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3Bi.4 (2000); see also 139 CONG.
REc. 15638 (1991) (stating that the Sentencing Commission is to establish higher
penalties when an adult uses or attempts to use a minor in any federal offense).
12. Compare United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1288 (1lth Cir. 2001)
(holding that the enhancement is applicable so long as the minor's involvement in the
crime was foreseeable), with United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that section 3B1.4 does not apply unless the defendant took "affirmative steps"
to involve a minor in the crime).
13. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 1287-88; Butler, 207 F.3d at 847-49. The Sixth
Circuit has recently noted that "the Supreme Court will ultimately have to resolve" this
circuit conflict. United States v. Borkowski, No. 98-2226, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21655,
at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 2, 2001).
14. 207 F.3d 839.
15. Id. at 847.
16. 252 F.3d 1279.
17. See id. at 1288. For perhaps the broadest interpretation of "use" in section
3B1.4, see United States v. Warner, 204 F.3d 799, 800-01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that
the defendant's conduct necessitated a sentencing enhancement when he brought his
eight-year-old daughter with him to purchase ephedrine tablets).
18. See Miller, supra note 10 (discussing flaws in the Guidelines).
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determined, the federal courts will lack uniformity, and adults in
different jurisdictions will be subject to unequal sentences despite
committing identical acts. These factors may also contribute to the
increase in appellate caseload as a result of challenges to sentences.1 9
Fairness and judicial efficiency demand that the applicable meaning of
"use" in section 3B1.4 be established conclusively. Further, the
Sentencing Commission appears reluctant to resolve this conflict, thus
requiring the Supreme Court to intervene and clarify the meaning of the
term.
In order to interpret section 3B1.4, tools of statutory interpretation
are necessary. 2° Textualism is not the generally accepted approach when
courts interpret statutes. 21 However, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
seemed to apply the doctrine, though quite differently, in their respective
2
cases. 22 Assuming that a textualist approach is the correct approach,23
this comment will analyze the current disagreement among the federal
courts on the proper textualist interpretation of section 3B1.4 of the
Guidelines.
This analysis will conclude that the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of "use" in section 31B1.4 is the correct textualist
interpretation because its definition of "use" is consistent with the term's
plain meaning, and because the results achieved by this interpretation are
more consistent with the tenets of textualism than 24those achieved by the
broader reading employed by the Eleventh Circuit.

Part II of this comment discusses the current split between the Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits over the construction of "use" in section 3B1.4.
Part III contains a discussion of textualism, the theory of statutory
interpretation that relies strictly on the meaning of the statutory text to

19. See

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL

1999 (2001) (noting that defendants filed ninety-five percent of the appeals in
1999), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf.
20. The Guidelines have the force and effect of law and are to be construed as if they
were statutes. See United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999). Therefore,
courts may also employ theories of statutory interpretation to construe the Guidelines.
See id.
21. See Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in
Statutory Cases, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 235 (1997). However, the text remains a crucial
piece of any statutory analysis. See infra Part IlI.A.
22. Compare McClain, 252 F.3d at 1288, with United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839,
849 (6th Cir. 2000).
23. Whether textualism is the correct approach to statutory interpretation in this
context or in general is beyond the scope of this comment. This comment instead focuses
on whether textualism as employed by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits can resolve the
dispute.
24. The "more inclusive understanding of 'use' has long been recognized in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court." United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 114 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
APPEALS,
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find the applicable definition of terms.25 Part IV analyzes the competing
textualist interpretations set forth by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits,
discusses the Eleventh Circuit's misapplication of textualism, and
concludes that the Sixth Circuit correctly interpreted section 3B 1.4.
II.

The Debate over the Meaning of "Use" in Section 3B 1.4

A.

The Sixth Circuit's "Affirmative Steps" Interpretationof "Use" in
Section 3B1. 4

In UnitedStates v. Butler, an adult defendant robbed a bank with the
assistance of a seventeen-year-old male.26 The adult defendant held a
gun to a bank employee's head while the minor removed money from
behind the teller counter.27 Later, on the day of the robbery, police
picked up the minor walking along a highway, and the minor made an
admission identifying the adult defendant as the individual who
accompanied him into the bank.28 The adult defendant pleaded guilty to
armed bank robbery.29
To determine whether the adult defendant "used" a minor to commit
a crime for purposes of section 3B1.4, the district court in Butler applied
a textualist approach.3 ° In doing so, the court followed what 31
it
provision.
the
of
language
unambiguous
clear,
the
considered
Accordingly, the district court enhanced the offense level of the adult
defendant pursuant to section 3B1.4 on the ground that he had
encouraged a minor to participate in the crime.3 2
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit also applied a textualist analysis in
interpreting the provision. 33 The court, to determine the plain meaning of
25. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits employed textualism to interpret section 3B 1.4.
See infra Part IL.A-B. Therefore, this comment focuses only on the proper textualist
interpretation of section 3B1.4. Although no other theory is discussed, that does not
imply that section 3B1.4 cannot be interpreted through other modes of statutory
interpretation. For a discussion of these other theories, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY,

CASES AND MATERIALS

CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed.

ON LEGISLATION:

1995) [hereinafter

STATUTES AND THE

ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE

CREATION].

26.
27.
28.
29.

See Butler, 207 F.3d at 842.
See id.
See id.
See id

30. See id. (stating that the district court relied only on language in the Guidelines
and attempted to determine the plain meaning of "use").
31. See id. (asserting that it was proper for the district court to take a plain meaning
approach because courts must follow the unambiguous language of a provision).

32. See id. at 847. The district court placed emphasis on the word "encourage" in
deciding whether or not to enhance the adult defendant's sentence. See id.
33. See id. (focusing on the text and determining the plain meaning of "use" rather
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"use," consulted a dictionary-a technique commonly employed by
textualists. 34 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the definition of "use"
supports the notion that section 3B 1.4 requires "affirmative steps" on the
part of the defendant.35 Because the adult defendant in Butler merely
partnered with the minor in a crime and both possessed equal authority in
the commission of the crime, the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant did
not "use" a minor under section 3B 1.4.36
In determining the meaning of section 3B1.4, the Sixth Circuit in
Butler also considered the language and design of the Guidelines as a
whole,37 in accordance with other textualists of the modem persuasion
who endorse the "whole act rule," rather than focusing on specific
language out of context. 38 The court stated that the Guidelines set forth
adjustments to the offense level based upon the role that the defendant
played in committing the offense. 39 According to the court, under the
district court's generous construction, any defendant who partnered with
a minor in a crime would be subject to the enhancement, a result that
would create, in effect, a strict liability enhancement. 40 The court
expressed concern that such a result would render the characterization of
section 3B1.4 as a "role-in-the-offense adjustment" a misnomer. 41
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reasoned, to deserve the enhancement under
section 3B1.4, the adult's "role-in-the-offense" requires action or control
over a minor rather than mere partnership.42
The Sixth Circuit also interpreted section 3B 1.4 so that the
than "encourage").
A court is unlikely to label its interpretation "textualist," or
"intentionalist," or any other theory of interpretation. The theory is deduced from the
court's language and analysis. A court employing intentionalism resorts to "legislative
history" or "legislative intent." Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984). A textualist
court emphasizes "plain meaning" and "text." United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310
U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940).
34. See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128-29 (1989).
35. Butler, 207 F.3d at 847 (noting that the dictionary defines "use" as "[t]o make
use of; to convert to one's service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a
purpose or action by means of; to put into action or service, especially to attain an end")
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)).
36. See id. at 849. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the two-level enhancement
pursuant to section 3B1.4 did not apply and that the district court erred. See id.
37. See id.
38. See United States Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); see also infra Part III.D.
39. See Butler, 207 F.3d at 848 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3,
pt. B, introductory cmt. (2000)).
40. See id.
41. Id. at 849 (stating that, under the district court's interpretation, if numerous adult
defendants participated in a crime along with a minor, each of the adult defendants would
receive the two-level enhancement, regardless of their roles in involving the minor in the
crime).
42. Id.
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provision's meaning would be consistent with its enabling statute.43
Examining the enabling provision, titled "Solicitation of a Minor to
Commit Crime," 44 the court interpreted the plain meaning of
"solicitation" to be "asking" or "enticing. '45 Because one could not
passively solicit the participation of a minor in a crime, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the section 3B1.4 enhancement should apply only 46when
the defendant takes affirmative action to involve a minor in a crime.
In addition, the Sixth Circuit identified other textual considerations
indicating that Congress did not aim to create a strict liability
enhancement for anyone who merely participates in a crime with a
minor.47 For example, Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission
to consider both the "severity of the crime" that the adult intended the
minor to commit and the "proximity in age" between the adult and the
minor.48 The court asserted that, if less than affirmative steps were
required, the relative ages of the offender and the minor would be
immaterial. 49 By deeming age relevant in the text, the court reasoned,
Congress imagined an adult who exercised some control or took some
assertive role to involve a minor in a crime.50 Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that, to deserve a section 3B 1.4 enhancement, an adult
defendant must do more than merely participate in the crime with a
minor.5 1
The Sixth Circuit's examination of section 3B1.4 concluded with an
analysis of 21 U.S.C. § 861, an analogous statutory provision
criminalizing the "use of juveniles in drug trafficking."5 2 Section 861
makes it unlawful for an adult "to knowingly and intentionally employ,
hire, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, a person under eighteen
years of age to violate federal drug laws." 53 The Sixth Circuit observed
43. See id
44. See id.; see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 28
U.S.C. § 994 (2002).
45. Butler, 207 F.3d at 848 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (6th ed. 1990)).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id. (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C.
§ 994 (2002)).
49. See id.
50. See id. at 848-49.
51. See id. at 848.
52. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 861 (1998)).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 861 (1998). Furthermore, when an adult involves "underage
individuals" in a drug offense, such as "unlawful manufacturing, importing, extorting,
trafficking, or possession," the Guidelines provide a two-level sentencing enhancement
for the adult defendant. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.2 (2000). If an
adult defendant involves a minor in his drug trafficking enterprise, a court has discretion
to apply a sentencing enhancement under either section 2D1.2 or section 3B1.4. Courts
applying a sentencing enhancement under section 2D1.2 or section 3B1.4 should not
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that courts interpreting section 861 generally required a showing that the
adult defendant was responsible for the "affirmative or active use of the
juvenile," 54 meaning that, in the criminal context, "use" of a minor to
commit a crime entails more than being an equal partner with a minor in
Therefore, the court interpreted "use" under
committing a crime.
section 3B1.4 consistent with other courts' interpretations of the term,
which was
equated with affirmative conduct rather than partnership with
56
minor.
a
B.

The Eleventh Circuit's "ForeseeableInvolvement" Interpretationof
"Use" in Section 3B1.4

In interpreting section 3B1.4, the Eleventh Circuit in United States
v. McClain reached a result contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Butler.57 In McClain, two adult defendants conspired to create and cash
counterfeit checks drawn on bank accounts at several federally insured
financial institutions.58 The defendants recruited young females to cash
the checks at various banks. 59 During the events in question, the
defendants recruited a sixteen-year-old female to cash counterfeit
checks.60 The defendants helped the female recruits obtain false
identification and also transported them to locations where they
negotiated the checks. 6' The district court found the defendants guilty of
conspiring to commit bank fraud and applied62section 3B 1.4 for "using" a
minor, enhancing their sentences two levels.
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit in Butler, claimed to
interpret section 3B 1.4 by determining the provision's plain and ordinary
meaning. 63 However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Sixth
"engage in impermissible double-counting," which would occur if a court applied both
sentencing enhancement provisions simultaneously to an adult defendant. United States
v. Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1993).
54. Butler, 207 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. McDonald, 877 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
55. See id. at 849; cf United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2001)
(modifying the Sixth Circuit's approach in Butler and providing an enhancement under
section 3B 1.4 when a minor is a partner in the crime so long as affirmative steps were
taken to involve the minor in the activity).
56. See Butler, 207 F.3d at 848-49.
57. See United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
58. See id. at 1281.
59. See id.
60. See id. According to the defendants, they asked the minor her age at the time
that they recruited her to cash the checks, and the minor responded that she was twenty
years old. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1283.
63. See id. at 1285.
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Circuit's position on a strict liability application of section 3B1.4. 4 The

Eleventh Circuit stated that, under the Guidelines, the determination of a
defendant's role in the offense is made on the basis of all relevant
conduct.65
The court reasoned that a strict liability enhancement would not be
applied to all adults, regardless of their roles, because the Guidelines
limit the possible number of defendants who may be subject to an
enhancement.6 6 Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) of the Guidelines provides:
[I]n the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, [enhancements]
shall be determined on the basis of all reasonably foreseeable acts
and omissions of others in furtherance of a jointly undertaken
criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense
of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course
of
67
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, if certain defendants did not foresee
the use of a minor in furtherance of a crime, then those defendants would
not receive the two-level enhancement. 68 Only defendants who could
have reasonably foreseen the use of a minor, the court stated, are
"culpable under the plain language of section 3B1.4.,, 6 9 By not analyzing
the meaning of the term "use," the court seemed to believe it had
interpreted "use" in an easy context.
The Eleventh Circuit provided a caveat by explaining that the
precise issue in Butler was not raised in McClain.70 The court noted that
Butler involved the question of whether partnering with a minor in a
federal crime is sufficient to warrant a sentencing enhancement pursuant
to section 3B1.4,71 whereas, in contrast, the defendants in McClain did
not dispute that they had "actively recruited" the minor to assist in the
check-cashing scheme. 72 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit in Butler did not
64. See id. at 1287. The court also noted that Butler was "not on all fours with the
instant case." Id.
65. See id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2000)). The
introductory comment to section lB 1.3 states that the determination of a defendant's role
in an offense is to be made based on all conduct included under section 1B1.3, and "not
solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction." U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, pt. B, introductory cmt. (2000).
66. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 1287 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
lB 1.3(a)(1)(B) (2000)).
67. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2000).
68. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 1288.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. (noting that the district court in Butler failed to find that the adult
defendant "directed, commanded, intimidated, counseled, trained, procured, recruited, or
solicited" a minor's participation in the robbery).
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73
consider section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted "use" in what it deemed an easy
context, and the meaning of "use" in that context does not preclude a
broader reading.74 It seems reasonable for a court to state that the case
before it falls within the meaning of the text, without also stating that
different facts might drive the court to articulate more carefully a
textualist analysis. Because courts do not issue advisory opinions
regarding factual scenarios -not before them, the Eleventh Circuit's
explanation for interpreting section 3B1.4 differently provides some
rationale for the court's dissimilar treatment. However, the difference in
facts between Butler and McClain does not entirely explain the Eleventh
Circuit's diverging application of textualism.75 Nonetheless, the court in
McClain found that, because the adult defendants could foresee
the
76
recruitment of a minor, the two-level enhancement was proper.

III. The Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation
A.

The FundamentalPrinciples
of Textualism: Finding the Plain
77

Meaning of Statutory Text

The text of a statute is now the principal inquiry at the Supreme
Court level and in other courts when interpreting the meaning of
statutory language.78 According to textualists, when a court interprets a
statute, the first step should be to look at the statute's language. 79 When
the meaning of a statute is clear, the court's analysis is complete. 80 The
73. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2000).
74. See McClain, 252 F.3d 1288.
75. See infra Part IV.
76. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 1288.
77. Several courts have invoked textualism to interpret the meaning of terms in the
Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757-59 (1997) (focusing
strictly on the text and referring to a dictionary to determine the meaning of
"maximum"). Although the text is the most important factor considered by courts, that
does not imply that textualism as a theory is the most accepted approach.
78. See ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 625.
79. See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning andHard Cases, 103 YALE L.J.
1561, 1564 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)).
Most judges, even if they are not "textualists," begin with the text. See ESKRIDGE,
STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 622. Therefore, a court should not be
labeled "textualist" merely because it began its interpretation with the text.
80. See, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (unanimous
decision) (stating that, when the terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1980) (asserting that, when the plain
meaning of a statute is clear, there is no need to look further). This comment analyzes an
unambiguous statutory provision. See infra Part IV.A. For an additional discussion of a
textualist interpretation when a term's meaning is clear, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623-24 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New
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rationale behind this method is that courts must give effect to the clear
meaning of statutes as they are written. 81 Under the textualist view, an
interpretation that is not limited to words permits too much judicial
discretion. 82
Even when a word is not defined by statute, textualists strictly
adhere to the text and construe the term according to its plain or ordinary
meaning. 83 To determine the ordinary meaning of words, textualists
routinely invoke dictionary definitions of the statutory term.84
85
Dictionaries are employed to assist the understanding of the court.
Obviously, many theoretical problems arise in consulting a dictionary to
determine the plain meaning of terms.86 As a result, textualists also give
meaning to a word based on the term's everyday meaning, or "ordinary
parlance. 8 7
Textualism]. It is worth noting that this comment does not intend to label the Supreme
Court as "textualist." Such a proposition would be completely inaccurate. Similarly, the
author does not intend to imply that the Sixth or Eleventh Circuits are proponents of
textualism under all circumstances. The Supreme Court decisions cited within this
comment demonstrate the Court's reliance on principles of textualism in those particular
cases. Since Justice Scalia's appointment to the Court in 1986, the Court's opinions have
focused more on the meaning of text than on legislative history. See ESKRIDGE,
STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 624.
81. See Cunningham et al., supra note 79, at 1564; see also Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 538 (1947) (stating that
those who focus on language are concerned only with what the words mean). Justice
Scalia utilizes textualism regularly and rarely consults sources outside the text. See
Rebecca L. Spiro, Note, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Rehnquist Court:
Theories of Statutory Interpretation,37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 103, 104 (2000).
82. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitabilityof PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 542-43 (1992) (stating that concerns about
judicial discretion have led to increased reliance on the plain meaning of words in a
statute).
83. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983). For a criticism of
textualism, see Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 580-84 (1982)
(Stevens, J.,dissenting) (criticizing textualism and stating that statutory construction
requires the judge to decide how the legislature intended the provision to apply). See also
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 341-45 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Statutory
Interpretation](summarizing the weaknesses of textualism).
84. See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128-29 (1989) (referring
to a dictionary to determine the plain meaning of "irregularity"). Applying a dictionary
definition is referred to as the "denotative approach" to plain meaning. ESKRIDGE,
STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 588.
85. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893).
86. For instance, dictionaries are not necessarily objective.
See ESKRIDGE,
STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 625. Dictionaries also present several
definitions of a term, possibly suggesting that only through context can the term be
identified. See id. Textualists could also engage in "dictionary shopping," or in
"definition shopping" within any particular dictionary, to select "the better definition"
and ignore others. Id. at 626.
87. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that
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88
The Textualist Disregardfor Legislative History

A strict textualist approach to statutory interpretation does not
involve legislative history, 89 which textualists discount as unreliable, 90
and irrelevant once the plain meaning of a statute is determined. 9 1
Textualists reason that their approach is required by "democratic theory"
because Congress enacted the statutory text, not the legislative
deliberations, as law. 92
Moreover, legislative history, including
committee reports and floor debates, represents only views of
components of Congress.93
[T]he meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined,
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been
understood by a larger handful of Members of Congress; but rather
on the basis of which meaning is most in accord with... ordinary
"ordinary parlance calls the paper containing tiny crystals of LSD a mixture"), aff'd sub
nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991); see also Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993) (stating that, when a word is not defined by statute, the
Court will interpret it in accord with its "natural meaning").
88. Legislative history is most often employed when interpreting a statute according
to intentionalism, another doctrine of statutory interpretation. See Eskridge, Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 83, at 326-27 (describing several theories of statutory
interpretation). Rather than attempt to find meaning in the text, intentionalists look for
the actual intent of the legislators who enacted the statute. See Comm'r v. Engle, 464
U.S. 206, 214 (1984). For example, in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers ofAmerica, 404
U.S. 528 (1972), the Court interpreted the procedural structure of title IV of the
Landrum-Griffin Act by relying entirely on statements made at Senate hearings by the
sponsor of the proposed legislation.
See id. at 536-39.
For an overview of
intentionalism, see Eskridge, Statutory Interpretation,supra note 83, at 326-29.
89. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1986) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing the majority's "exhaustive investigation" of legislative history after
interpreting the text).
90. Judge Easterbrook, a well-known proponent of textualism, believes that
legislative history has no more force than an opinion poll of Congress, and that legislative
history is a poor guide to the legislators' intent because it is written by staff rather than
members of Congress. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (7th Cir. 1989).
91. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21-23 (1983). Contra Stephen
Breyer, Of the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
845, 850-58 (1992) (discussing the benefits of employing legislative history to interpret
statutes).
92. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 301 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Miller v. Comm'r, 836 F.2d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir.
1988) .(asserting that committee reports are not voted on by the full membership of both
houses, nor are they approved by the president); Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d
1423, 1426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress adopted the statute's language, not
speeches or debates crafted by assistants to those elected by the people).
93. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527 (1982) (noting concerns
with allowing the views of a single legislator to determine the meaning of a statute). But
see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1301 (1990)
(arguing that legislative history is important to statutory interpretation).
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usage, and thus most likely to have been understood
by the whole
94
Congress which voted on the words of the statute.

Textualists consider the words of a statute to be the most persuasive
evidence of Congress's intent, 95 and they begin with the assumption that
the legislative purpose is best expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words.96

C.

The Absurd Result Exception to Textualism

Textualists, including Justice Scalia, 97 will look beyond the
98
statutory text if a strict textual interpretation produces an absurd result.
It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to a literal reading
of statutes if necessary to avoid absurd results. 99 Textualists look beyond
the text when the absurdity would be obvious to anyone.' 0 0 The
absurdity that justifies ignoring the text must be "so monstrous, that all
°
mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application."'' 0
94. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
95. See id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. See id. (Scalia, J, concurring). Some scholars also argue that textualism is "a
device not for ignoring the legislative history but for shifting onto legislative history the
burden of proving that the words do not mean what they appear to say." Eskridge,
Statutory Interpretation,supra note 83, at 344 n.92.
97. Justice Scalia has been referred to as the "most conspicuous critic" of referring
to legislative history to interpret statutes. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common
Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:Implicationsfor the
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998). Yet, in a few
instances, even a strict textualist such as Justice Scalia looks beyond the text to avoid an
absurd result. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "I
think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including.., the legislative
history of [the law's] adoption" to interpret a statute that, "if interpreted literally,
produces an absurd.

. .

result").

98. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (stating
that the Court will not allow a literal reading of a statute to produce a result remarkably at
odds with the intentions of the drafters); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (stating that, if a literal construction results in absurdity, the act
must be construed to avoid that result).
99. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1868).
100. See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
101. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 203 (1819). An example of an absurd
result is found in Bock Laundry. In Bock Laundry, the Court dealt with Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a), FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1989), amended by FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1990),
which requires a judge to allow impeachment of any witness with prior convictions for
felonies not involving dishonesty, only if the probative value of the evidence is greater
than its prejudice to the defendant. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 507. A plain meaning
of "defendant" in Rule 609(a) would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an
adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil defendant, and allow civil defendants but
not civil plaintiffs the benefit of weighing prejudice. See id. The Court stated that it was
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The Whole Act Rule: Contextual-Textualism

When contextual arguments strongly cut against the textual ones,
some textualists move beyond a specific provision for their
interpretation. 10 2 0 3Such textualists, using a method referred to as the
"whole act rule,"' look to the entire statutory text rather than a term in
isolation because they believe that other provisions can influence a
term's meaning. ° 4 Other provisions of the statute may clarify a specific
term that seems 05
ambiguous, particularly when the same terminology
exists elsewhere. 1

Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a
communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each
interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate
take their purport
06
from the setting in which they were [employed].1
Some courts employing textualism to interpret a specific provision
of the Guidelines have invoked this rule. 10 7 These courts have
often
08
relied on the text of official commentaries to specific provisions.'
This group of textualists further claims that, if the meaning of a
term is consistent with the structure of the entire statute, then the result is
not absurd.10 9 However, most textualists consult other provisions only to
buttress meaning already found, or to clarify a specific, ambiguous
term.n" 0 Textualists, as standard procedure, may consider the language of
incomprehensible why a civil plaintiff, but not a civil defendant, should be subjected to
such undue prejudice. See id. The Court, going beyond the text of Rule 609(a) for its
interpretation, concluded that the provision "cannot mean what it says." Id.
102. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-88 (1983)
(construing the language of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
within the framework of the entire Internal Revenue Code).
103.
ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 651 (referring to this
doctrine of statutory interpretation as the "whole act rule"). For a critique of the "whole
act rule," see Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the rule because the arrangement of different
statutory provisions often results from "legislative accident").
104. See Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 426,430 (Ark. 1983) (Hatfield,
J., dissenting) (stating that this inquiry goes beyond an isolated word to analyze the effect
that other sections have on that term).
105. See United States Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
106. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
107. See, e.g., Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 127-28 (1996) (stating that
"the court must put this provision in context").
108. See, e.g., id. (interpreting the text of section 5KI. 1 of the Guidelines and also its
commentary).
109. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1345 (7th Cir. 1989).
110. See ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 639-40.
Textualists might also utilize a canon of statutory construction similar to the "whole act
rule." The canon, noscitur a sociis, suggests that sometimes light may be shed on the
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the whole statute in conjunction with a specific provision."' However,
even this group recognizes a common textualist limitation to the "whole
act rule": If the result of a contextual interpretation brings about
disharmony, then the interpretation "should not be accepted,1 2for absurd,
conflicting and contradictory results should not be imputed."'
IV. Analysis of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit's Competing Textualist
Interpretations of "Use" in Section 3B 1.4
A.

The Best Textualist Interpretation:The Sixth Circuit's "Affirmative
Steps" Interpretationof Section 3B1. 4
1.

The Sixth Circuit's Textualist Interpretation of "Use" in
Section 3B1.4

Ignoring legislative history 1 3 and following the pattern of other
courts that have interpreted section 3B1.4,1 14 the Sixth Circuit in Butler
began its textualist interpretation by looking solely at the text of section
3B1.4." 5' The Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the term "use," the
most important piece of this textualist analysis. The court properly
determined the ordinary meaning of "use" by consulting Black's Law
Dictionary.16
Opponents of textualism may argue that the court engaged in
"dictionary shopping." This group would claim that the Sixth Circuit
selected a dictionary that defined "use" in a manner that the court
preferred. 117 However, several other dictionaries define "use" in a way

meaning of words by the words surrounding them. See id. at 641. Noscitur a sociis
means: "[i]t is known from its associates."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1668 (7th ed.

1999). Textualism posits that canons of construction should have some role in finding
the meaning of text. See ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 631.

The extent of this role is uncertain.
11. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (acknowledging that
courts usually consider other parts of a statute to support their interpretation).
112. Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Ark. 1983) (Hatfield, J.,
dissenting).
113. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 847-49 (6th Cir. 2000).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 116 F.3d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir. 1997)
(looking only at the text of section 3B 1.4 and invoking the common meaning of "use").
115. See Butler, 207 F.3d at 847.
116. See id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)). Unless the
legislative body has provided a specific definition, textualists believe that courts should
follow the dictionary definitions of terms. See Pittson Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S.
105, 113 (1988).
117.

See ESKRIDGE, STATUTES

AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 625-26

(discussing "dictionary shopping" and other flaws in the doctrine of textualism).
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that is consistent with the "affirmative steps" meaning found by the
court."' One of these dictionaries defines "use" as "to make or take use
of," "to put into practice or operation," "to carry into action or effect,"
"to employ for a certain end or purpose," and "to work, employ, or
manage."" 19 Since the meaning of "use" is clear and familiar to most, the
shopping." Rather, the court
Sixth Circuit did not engage in "dictionary
12
assigned "use" its established meaning. 0
The Sixth Circuit appropriately continued its textualist analysis by
addressing the remaining text of section 3B 1.4. Section 3B 1.4 notes that
"used or attempted to use includes directing, commanding, encouraging,
12
intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting.' '
These words are not definitions of "use" specified by the Sentencing
Commission. 122 Rather, these words are examples of behavior that
denote "use" of a minor. Like the term "use," this list of words addresses
active, not passive, conduct. The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of "use"
is in harmony with the plain meaning of the remainder of section 3B1.4.
The court in Butler complied with the textualist principle 23that courts
should interpret terms within a provision in a similar manner.
2.

Supporting the Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of "Use" with
Context

The Sixth Circuit's definition has the virtue of simplicity. The Sixth
Circuit could have ended its textualist analysis after determining the
ordinary meaning of "use.' 24 However, the court decided to look
118. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1486 (3d ed. 2000)
(defining "use" as "to put into service or apply for a purpose" and "to employ"); THE
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1024-25 (3d ed. 1980) (defining "use" as "to employ"
or "to exploit"); 11 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468, 470-72 (1st ed. 1970).

Textualists often refer to both dictionary definitions and the everyday meaning of words
to determine the applicable interpretation of words. See supra Part III.A.
119.

11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468,470-72 (1st ed. 1970).

120. Other courts have previously agreed with this interpretation of "use." See, e.g.,
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (finding that a conviction for "use" of a
firearm requires a showing that the defendant actively employed a firearm); United States
v. LaFave, 133 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that, although an adult's awareness of a
minor's participation in hazardous dumping would not support application of section
3B1.4, payments by the adult to the minor for performing the dumping would merit the
enhancement).
121.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1 (2000).

122. Textualists follow the ordinary meaning of terms unless the legislative body
gives a specified or technical meaning. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 64 (1989).
123. For another example of this textualist rule, see Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,
484-85 (1990).
124. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1980) (stating that, when the plain
language of a statutory provision is clear, there is no need to look beyond the words).
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beyond section 3B1.4 to buttress its interpretation, 125 a technique
commonly employed by textualists to bolster an interpretation of a
specific provision.126 The Sixth Circuit first referred to the introductory
comment to the Guidelines, titled "Role in the Offense."' 127 The ordinary
meaning of the term "role" is "function or position."' 128 The meaning of
"role" contains an active element. The plain meaning of "use" also
negates the element of passivity.
Thus, the "affirmative steps"
interpretation of "use" in section 3B1.4 is consistent with a textualist
interpretation of "role" in the introductory comment.
Although a textualist interpretation is at times a "holistic
endeavor,"' 29 courts employing textualism must avoid interpreting
another provision in a way that is inconsistent with the term in
question. 30 The consistency between the meanings of "use" and "role"
indicates that, from a textualist perspective, the Sixth Circuit properly
interpreted "use" in the first instance. Interpreting a term beyond section
3B1.4 did not detract anything from the court's -preceding textualist
analysis of "use." The court's textualist interpretation of "use" was
bolstered, not scathed, by this contextual approach. 131
The Sixth Circuit also interpreted "use" in a manner that is
consistent with the language of section 3B1.4's enabling statute, titled
"Solicitation of a Minor to Commit Crime.' 32 The court, relying on a
dictionary definition, concluded that the ordinary meaning of
"solicitation" is "to entice. 1 33 Again, this raises the concern of
"dictionary shopping."
Another dictionary, however, defines
"solicitation" as "to incite or urge," "to move or induce," "to put in
motion," and "to petition a person for, or to do, something.' 3 4 The
125. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 847-49 (6th Cir. 2000).
126. See supra Part Ill.D; see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491-93
(1994) (referring to other provisions of the Guidelines in order to strengthen its
interpretation of a specific provision).
127.

Butler, 207 F.3d at 848 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, pt.

B, introductory cmt. (2000)).
128. E.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1182 (3d ed. 2000); The
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 787 (3d ed. 1980).

129. United States Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484
U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
130. See Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Ark. 1983) (Hatfield,
J., dissenting).
131.

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 128, at 1182; see

also supra text accompanying note 128.
132. Butler, 207 F.3d at 848 (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2002)).
133.
134.

Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (6th ed. 1990)).
10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 394-95 (1st ed. 1970); see also BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 1398 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "solicitation" as "requesting or seeking to
obtain"); THE OxFoRD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 871 (3d ed. 1980) (defining "solicitation"
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definition utilized by the Sixth Circuit is not an "idiosyncratic dictionary
definition. 1 35 The Sixth Circuit provided the plain meaning of the term
"solicitation," which refers specifically to active behavior.
Based on this analysis, the Sixth Circuit's "affirmative steps"
interpretation of "use" is consistent with other sections of the statutory
scheme. 136 Although the doctrine of textualism did not require the Sixth
Circuit to examine this provision, 137 the analysis further substantiated the
court's textualist interpretation of "use." The meaning of "use" is in
accord with ordinary usage, context, and the surrounding body of law.
3.

Other Textualist Interpretations of "Use"

To strengthen its "affirmative steps" interpretation of "use," the
Sixth Circuit evaluated ways in which other courts have interpreted the
term "use" in the criminal context to require affirmative conduct. 138 The
Supreme Court interpreted the term in Smith v. United States, 139 which
involved the question of whether trading a firearm for drugs constitutes
"use" of a firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 140 Like
the Sixth Circuit in Butler, the Court's only concerns were the text and
the plain meaning of "use."' 14 1 By attempting to trade a firearm for drugs,
the Court reasoned, the defendant in Smith
"used" or "employed the gun
42
as an item of barter to obtain drugs.'
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia disagreed with the type of
conduct that the majority considered to be the "use" of a firearm:
To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended
purpose. When someone asks, "Do you use a cane?," he is not
inquiring whether you have your grandfather's silver-handled
walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you
as "to seek to obtain" and "to ask for earnestly"). In addition, "solicit" is defined as "to
seek or obtain by persuasion" and "to petition persistently." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1295 (3d ed. 2000).
135. Textualists disregard "idiosyncratic dictionary definitions" in determining the
plain meaning of statutory terms. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218,
224 (1994).
136. The "whole act rule" does not limit a court to other parts of the statute at issue.
The rule refers to the entire statutory scheme. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 496
U.S. 661, 668-69 (1990).
137. See Cunningham et al., supra note 79, at 1564 (stating that, when a textualist
establishes the meaning of a term, the inquiry ends).
138. Butler, 207 F.3d at 848-49; see, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 877 F.2d 91, 93
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (interpreting "use" in 21 U.S.C. § 861 to require employment and
utilization).
139. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
140. See id. at 228.
141. See id. at 229.
142. Id.

2002]

CROSSING TEXTUALIST PATHS

walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of "using a firearm"
143 is to speak
of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.
Although Justice Scalia contended that a cane on display is not "used"
simply because that cane has the potential to be employed for walking,
he agreed that the plain, ordinary meaning of "use" requires assertive
behavior. 44 The term "foreseeable" is absent from the ordinary meaning
of "use." Therefore, an interpretation that reaches passive conduct is
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the term.
Smith confirms that the Sixth Circuit's "affirmative steps"
interpretation of "use" is aligned with the accepted textualist
interpretation of the term. 145 When a legislative body employs terms that
have acquired settled meaning under the common law, a court must infer
that the legislators incorporated the established meaning of these
46
terms. 1
4.

The Sixth Circuit's Employment of a Canon of Statutory
Construction To Corroborate Its Textualist Interpretation of
"Use"

The Sixth Circuit in Butler inadvertently employed the canon
noscitur a sociis, 147 which further augments the court's textualist
interpretation of "use." Under noscitur a sociis, "use," which is the
general term, bears a meaning that is similar to the meanings of the
specific terms that surround it.148 The commentary to section 3B1.4
states that "used or attempted to use" includes "directing, commanding,
encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or
soliciting,' ' 149 all of which suggest various types of active conduct. The
Sixth Circuit's "affirmative steps" interpretation of "use" is not only
consistent with these terms as a matter of strict textualism, 150 it is also
supplemented by a canon commonly accepted and used by textualists.151
143. Id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the "ordinary meaning of using a
cane requires walking").
145. See id. at 229 (stating that the defendant "employed" or "used" the gun).
146. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988).
147. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 848-49 (6th Cir. 2000). The canon,
noscitura sociis, suggests that light may be shed on the meaning of a word by the words
surrounding it. See ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 641. See
supra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of noscitur a sociis.
148. See Butler, 207 F.3d at 847-49.
149. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4, cmt. n.1 (2000).
150. The court in Butler interpreted all of the terms in section 3B1.4 consistent with
one another. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
151. See ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 639-40
(discussing noscitur a sociis). Under the Sixth Circuit's "affirmative steps"
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The Inapplicability of the Absurd Result Exception to the
Sixth Circuit's Textualist Interpretation of "Use"

Although the absurd result principle is a legitimate exception to a
strict textualist analysis, 152 the exception is inapplicable to the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of "use" in section 3B1.4. The Sixth Circuit's
"affirmative steps" interpretation of "use" does not create an absurdity
that is "so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense," 153 thus
justifying a departure from the text. Even from a non-textualist
perspective, the court's "affirmative steps" interpretation of "use" is
reasonable1 54 because the term is defined according to its everyday
meaning. 1555 This interpretation is not an "unthinkable disposition.*,156 A
court may disagree with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of "use" from a
doctrinal standpoint, but it is unlikely that any court would find the
"affirmative steps" interpretation of "use" to be absurd.
B.

A Misapplicationof Textualism: The Eleventh Circuit's
"ForeseeableInvolvement" Interpretationof Section 3B1.4
1.

The Eleventh Circuit's Disregard for the Plain Meaning of
"Use" in Section 3B1.4

Like the Sixth Circuit in Butler, the Eleventh Circuit in McClain
appropriately began its textualist interpretation of "use" by ignoring
legislative history and focusing on the text of section 3B1.4.1 57 Although
the court consulted only the text, the court misapplied other aspects of
textualism.
The Eleventh Circuit stated that "[language in the
158
Sentencing Guidelines is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
interpretation, "use" is surrounded by terms with similar meanings.
SENTENCING GUIDELrNES MANUAL § 3B1.4, cmt. n. 1(2000).
152.

See U.S.

See supra Part III.C.

153. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
154. Some courts will not follow the plain meaning of statutory text if it conflicts with
"reasonableness." E.g., Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966). This
appears to be a more lenient version of the absurd result exception. See supra Part III.C
for a discussion of the absurd result exception.
155. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 847 (6th Cir. 2000).
156. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that it is appropriate to consult legislative history "to verify that what
seems to us an unthinkable disposition.., was indeed unthought of"). A court has yet to
conclude that the absurd result exception should apply to the Sixth Circuit's "affirmative
steps" interpretation of "use." See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1121
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation is "sound").
157. See United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2001).
158. Id.
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Yet, the Eleventh Circuit did not identify any authority that defines the
' 59
common meaning of "use" in relation to "foreseeable involvement.'
Nor did the court discuss how people apply "use" in everyday
language. 160 The Eleventh Circuit was content with stating that it looked
at the plain language of "use," but disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's
position.161 The court appears to believe it had interpreted "use" in an
easy context.
The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Butler confirmed that, from a
textualist perspective, the meaning of "use" is clear. Had the Eleventh
Circuit attempted to determine the plain meaning of "use," the court
could have interpreted the term in only one way. The Sixth Circuit's
interpretation exposes the Eleventh Circuit's disregard for the plain
meaning of "use."
2.

The Eleventh Circuit's Contextual-Textualist Interpretation

After ignoring the most crucial piece of a textualist analysis, the
Eleventh Circuit in McClain endeavored to find the applicable meaning
of "use" by referring to other sections of the Guidelines.' 62 Generally,
textualists consider such a method, under which a provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is clarified by other sections, 163 as
irrefutable. The Eleventh Circuit analyzed section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), 64 a
provision that allows courts to determine sentencing enhancements based
on "reasonably foreseeable
acts," in order to determine that "use"
165
includes passive actions.
Although textualists are not prohibited from interpreting a provision
by reference to "the whole act,"'166 the Eleventh Circuit's contextual
analysis overlooks a critical textualist principle. When the result of a
contextual interpretation brings about disharmony, the court should67
disregard context and focus on the meaning of the term in question.
The Eleventh Circuit's "textualist" interpretation resulted in such an
inconsistency, yet the court failed to abandon context. i68
159. Id. at 1287-88.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1287.
162. See id. at 1287-88.
163. See United States Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
164. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 1287.
165. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2000).
166. See supraPart III.D (describing the role of context in a textualist analysis).
167. See Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Ark. 1983) (Hatfield,
J., dissenting) (asserting that a court should disregard context when this conflict arises).
168. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 1286-88. Legislative error may be the cause of this
inconsistency. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977) (Brennan,
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In addition, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis elevated the "whole act
rule" over plain meaning. The ordinary meaning of "foresee" differs
from the ordinary meaning of "use., 169 A textualist interpretation would
have accepted the common meaning of "use" despite its conflict with
another section of the Guidelines. 170 Alternatively, a proper textualist
interpretation would reconcile the plain meaning of "use" with section
1B1.3(a)(1)(B), rather than allowing the plain meaning of "use" to be
trumped by context. The term "use" is the focal point of the textualist
analysis, and other provisions are supplemental aids. Textualists adopt
the plain meaning of a specific provision targeting a particular issue
171
rather than the meaning of provisions generally covering the issue.
The Eleventh Circuit should have disregarded the provision pertaining to
sentencing enhancements generally and relied solely upon the plain
meaning of "use" in the more specific provision, or at least made an
attempt to square the provision with section 3B 1.4.
By adopting this interpretation of "use," the Eleventh Circuit
established an additional requirement to section 3B1.4, a result that it
specifically rejected as improper earlier in the same opinion. The
defendants in McClain, in addition to arguing that they did not "use" a
minor to commit a crime, contended that section 3B 1.4 requires intent to
use someone that the defendant knows to be a minor. 172 The court stated
that "the plain language of [section 3B1.4] categorically imposes an
enhanced penalty upon defendants who 'used or attempted to use' a
[minor] to commit... an offense."' 173 The court emphasized that there
exists "no qualifying language in [section 3B1.4] reserving the
enhancement
for defendants who knew that the person... was a
' 174
minor.
J., dissenting) (stating that different provisions may be the consequence of "legislative
accident," caused by the fact that the legislative body is too busy to do all of its work
carefully). This disharmony may not be recognized by other theories of interpretation.
Perhaps only a textualist interpretation results in these seemingly contrary provisions.
169. "Foresee" is defined as "to see beforehand," "to consider beforehand," and
"known beforehand by sight to." 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 440 (1st ed. 1970); see
also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 533 (3d ed. 2000) (defining
"foresee" as "to see or know beforehand"); THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 341 (3d

ed. 1980) (defining "foresee" as "to be aware of'). The term "foreseeable" is defined as
"being reasonably anticipatable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999). See
supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the meaning of "use."
170. See Eskridge, Statutory Interpretation,supra note 83, at 342-43 (stating that
textualists usually consider only the specific provision in isolation).
171. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co, 490 U.S. 504, 524-26 (1989);
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1987).
172. See McClain, 252 F.3d at 1284 (discussing the defendants' claim that a scienter
requirement exists in section 3B 1.4).
173. Id. at 1286.
174. Id.
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Similarly, the text of section 3B 1.4 lacks qualifying language that
requires an enhancement when an adult foresees a minor's involvement
in a crime. By its own terms, section 3B1.4 indicates that only adults
who take affirmative actions to involve a minor in a crime deserve the
enhancement.175 If the Sentencing Commission intended courts to
consider the "foreseeable involvement" of a minor, it could have
expressly provided those terms in the text of section 3B 1.4. However,
the court did not address this inconsistency.
Based on the language of section 3B 1.4, a textualist cannot contend
76
that that provision applies to the "foreseeable involvement" of minors.
From a textualist standpoint, such a reading ignores the ordinary
meaning of "use."
Although textualists employ contextual analyses,177 textualists do
not ignore the meaning of the term at issue. The Eleventh Circuit
deprived the term "use" of its ordinary meaning, resulting in the term
becoming surplusage and an unnecessary part of section 3B 1.4.
This is not a situation where the meaning of a term is determined
only . by context. 178
Textualists generally employ contextual
interpretations to buttress the plain meaning of a specific term. 179 The
Eleventh Circuit implemented an incorrect textualist method and, in
doing so, ignored the most fundamental tenet of textualism. 180 The
pivotal step was to find the plain meaning of the term "use" in section
3B1.4. 181
The court was not obligated to extend its analysis any
82
further. 1
175. See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
text of section 3B 1.4 "plainly requires actions" by the defendant).
176. The text of section 3B1.4 states that, "[i]f the defendant used or attempted to use
a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the offense or assist in avoiding
detection of, or apprehension for, the offense, [the court shall] increase [the sentence] by
two levels." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (2000). The Sentencing
Commission did not codify a definition of the term "foreseeable" in section 3B 1.4.
177. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449-51 (1988); Lawrence M. Solan,
Learning Our Outer Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 235, 275 (1997) (stating that the meaning of statutory language depends on
context).
178. Since the Eleventh Circuit could have found the applicable definition of "use" in
section 3B1.4 by referring to dictionaries or the everyday meaning of "use," placing the
term in the context of the Guidelines was unnecessary.
179. See supra Part III.D.
180. The Eleventh Circuit's comparison of section 3B 1.4 to another provision of the
Guidelines also reveals a flaw in the "whole act rule." The rule assumes that a statute is
written as a whole and that the legislature was aware of other provisions when it enacted
the present one. See ESKRIDGE, STATUTES AND THE CREATION, supra note 25, at 651.
181. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the beginning, and often the end, of a textualist interpretation should be the
plain meaning of the statutory provision).
182. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The Sixth Circuit in Butler also referred to other provisions, but
only for the purpose of reinforcing the plain meaning of "use., 183 That
step was unnecessary for the court, 184 but the court conducted the
analysis correctly.
Despite claims of analyzing only the text, the
Eleventh Circuit's approach failed to determine the plain meaning of the
185
term "use," meaning that there was no finding for the court to bolster.
This is not regarded as an acceptable textualist approach.
3.

Did the Eleventh Circuit Intentionally Apply Another Theory
of Interpretation?

The Eleventh Circuit may have been signaling an end to the rigid
application of textualism in its cases by deliberately relying more on the
"whole act" than the text of section 3B1.4. On the other hand, the court
may have been merely mirroring many other courts by beginning with
the plain meaning of "use," which itself does not signify that the court
employed a textualist analysis. 186 Yet, the court's words in McClain,
'188
such as "the plain language of the section, ' 87 "ordinary meaning,"
and
"the [c]ourt looks to the language... of the Sentencing Guidelines for
instruction, ' 89 in conjunction with its refusal to look at legislative
history or other sources, suggests that the court remains committed to
textualist principles.
It would not be objectionable if the Eleventh Circuit chose to
interpret section 3B 1.4 with a different theory of interpretation, or under
a hybrid of two or more theories. However, concerns emerge when the
court, while applying a theory other than textualism, declared that the
"[1]anguage in the Sentencing Guidelines is to be given its plain and
ordinary meaning."' 9 0 If the Eleventh Circuit wanted to separate from
textualism, then the court should have clearly stated the choice. Instead,

183.

United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 847-49 (6th Cir. 2000).

184. The Sixth Circuit determined that the plain meaning of "use" supports the notion
that section 3B 1.4 requires affirmative action by an adult to involve a minor in a crime.
See id. at 847. The court could have safely ended its analysis at that moment.
Textualism did not require the Sixth Circuit's examination of other provisions. See
Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
185. See United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1286-88 (11 th Cir. 2001).
186. A court that begins its analysis with the plain meaning of a term is not
necessarily embracing textualism as a theory. Many courts begin with the plain meaning
of a term and then proceed to consult other sources, such as legislative history, the
apparent purpose of the statutory provision, or policy. See Eskridge, Statutory
Interpretation,supra note 83, at 340-45.
187. McClain, 252 F.3d at 1286.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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the court used the language and methods of textualism, but applied them
incorrectly. Although the court focused strictly on the text and did not
consult other sources, 191 the court focused on the wrong components of
the text and ignored the term at issue. The Eleventh Circuit's approach is
not persuasive textualism; yet, that is what the court suggests that it was
applying.
V.

Conclusion

The Sentencing Commission should be applauded for adopting
section 3B 1.4 of the Guidelines. Our country must do all that it can to
assure that our children are shielded from crime. A sentencing
enhancement for adults who "use" a minor to commit a crime may prove
to be an effective deterrent for those who seek the assistance of children
in their criminal activities. However, until courts employing textualism
establish a uniform interpretation of what "using" a minor entails, courts
may consider section 3B1.4 more of a nuisance than a valuable tool for
penalizing criminals.
The Sixth Circuit in Butler properly utilized textualism to interpret
"use" in section 3B 1.4. The Eleventh Circuit in McClain, on the other
hand, veered from the textualist course from the outset. Although the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of "use" may be better than others from
a policy perspective, it has little support in textualist theory. 192 If courts

adopt the Eleventh Circuit's "foreseeable involvement" interpretation of
"use" in section 3B 1.4, those courts should be cautious of claims that the
interpretation is based on the textualist model. Otherwise, not only will
such courts similarly misapply the doctrine of textualism, but they may
inhibit the proper functioning of section 3B1.4 as a sentencing
enhancement. It would then become even more difficult to defend the
of Guidelines as the reasoned system that Congress
current system
93
imagined. 1

191. See id. at 1287-88.
192. Whether the Sixth or Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is a better approach to
section 3B1.4 than other interpretations cannot be determined based on this comment.
Factors beyond the text, such as legislative history or the purpose of the enhancement,
could possibly render a better interpretation. Many scholars criticize textualism for
ignoring these considerations and being overly-simplistic. See, e.g., Morell E. Mullins,
Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L. REv. 9 (2000). An
evaluation of all applicable theories would have to be conducted in order to determine the
proper construction of section 3B1.4. For a discussion of the theories most commonly
applied by modem courts, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme
Court 1993 Term: Foreword,108 HARV. L. REv. 97 (1994).
193. See Miller, supra note 10, at 723 (stating that the Guidelines are one of the great
failures at law reform because of their inconsistent administration among courts).

